Thomas Graham on how to rectify mistakes the West made in dealing with Russia

THE COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union created great hopes of an enduring partnership between the West and Russia. And yet, a little more than 30 years on, Russia has become an unrelenting adversary. Why? There is much truth in the prevailing Western narrative, which lays the blame squarely on Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. He rebuilt Russia’s traditional authoritarian regime and then challenged the American-led liberal world order ever more brazenly. Aspiring to restore the Russian empire, he attacked Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 before launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

This is not the full picture, however. It absolves the West, and first of all America, of any responsibility for the current situation. That position is untenable. Mr Putin was not operating in a vacuum, but often responding to what he considered to be threats from the West. As distasteful as it might seem under current circumstances, Western policymakers need to take a critical look at post-cold-war American policy if they are to deal more effectively with the challenge from Russia—today and in the future.

At the end of the cold war, America set two goals. It sought to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community as a free-market democracy. But as a hedge against the possibility that Russia might revert to its authoritarian, imperial past, America also backed geopolitical pluralism in the former Soviet bloc. America’s support for economic and political reform in Russia, and for its membership in Western organisations, such as the G7 (turning it, for a time, into the G8), went hand in hand with promotion of NATO’s eastward enlargement, as well as the independence of those former Soviet states—especially Georgia and Ukraine—that were the keenest on joining Europe. That approach failed. 

The integration project was doomed from the start because it ran counter to Russia’s national aspirations and strategic imperatives. Some Russian officials might have said they were committed to free-market democracy and partnership with the West, but the elite as a whole remained loyal to the idea of a traditional, autocratic Russian state that retained strategic autonomy—that is, the freedom to form ad hoc coalitions with an array of different states to advance and defend its interests. They were interested not so much in reforming Russia as in restoring its power. They were never prepared to become just another European country under American leadership.

Russia saw America’s vigorous hedging as an attempt to block its return as a great power. Russia pushed back forcefully as its economy recovered in the 2000s, most visibly in the campaign to undo America’s diplomatic advances in the former Soviet space. At the same time, Mr Putin cracked down on foreign influences inside Russia, including Western-financed civil-society organisations, in order to restore the full sovereignty any great power must wield.

Nevertheless, adversarial relations were not inevitable. A more gradual approach to the eastward expansion of NATO, and of American influence in the former Soviet space, combined with less interference in Russia’s internal affairs, could have mollified the Kremlin. It would have given Russian leaders time to appreciate the benefits of co-operation as their country adjusted to the emerging geopolitical realities. But America was impatient to lock in the gains from Russia’s strategic weakness in Europe and the former Soviet bloc—and Mr Putin eventually concluded that he could restore Russia as a great power only through confrontation.

As a result, the West now faces a two-fold challenge: it must seek to defeat Russia’s strategic designs in Ukraine while preparing the ground for a less adversarial long-term relationship with Russia in an increasingly polycentric world. How does America transform a bitter adversary into a more constructive competitor?

Western unity in support of Ukraine will be essential. That task is not confined to the battlefield. Russian designs will be thwarted only if Ukraine ultimately becomes a strong, democratic and prosperous country anchored in the West. That multi-year task is critical to reconciling Russia to its current borders. As has been true throughout history, Russian expansion ends when it encounters strong, well-ordered states.

No matter what happens in Ukraine, however, Russia is not going to disappear as an American rival. Predictions of collapse or a democratic breakthrough are fantasies. On the contrary, Russia will almost certainly remain some version of its historical self: authoritarian in its domestic politics, expansionary in impulse, economically and technologically lagging, but determined to play the role of a great power. And its interests will remain at odds with America’s, as has been largely true since the United States emerged as a global power at the end of the 19th century.

This Russia will still matter, thanks to its large nuclear arsenal, its abundant natural resources, its location in the heart of Eurasia and its veto-wielding permanent seat on the UN Security Council, among other assets. The challenge for America is not so much to contain Russia as to harness its ambitions to the advancement of American national interests. This is especially important in channelling Chinese power in ways least detrimental to America—to encourage China, for example, to join Russia and America in creating the conditions for strategic stability, and to ensure that China does not dominate resource-rich Central Asia or the Northern Sea Route linking East Asia and Europe through Russian waters. It is also critical in meeting such global challenges as climate change, pandemics and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Success will require deft diplomacy: a careful balancing of resistance to, and accommodation of, Russian interests. Patience will be critical. Progress will come not through spectacular advances, but through the steady accumulation of incremental advantage over time. That is how America persevered in the cold war. That is the way forward today. ■

Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of “Getting Russia Right” (2023). He served as senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the presidency of George W. Bush.